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Editorial Views:
Choosing and Death
Can death be managed with dignity?
This editorial explores various world
views on when, where, and how to-
or, perhaps more importantly not to-
end one's life when the benefits of con-
tinued medical care are diminished or
futile. Developments in law in defining
choices about dying show some courses
of action.
By Alison McChrystal Barnes
' You Americans," laughed my expatriate
Cuban friend Marthe, "You think death
is an option."
Death is optional, Americans; a choice to be
timed on life's Dayminder. A disaster perhaps, but
managed so its impact leaves everything else-
property, bereaved emotions, the principal's sense
of prospective loss, and even the physical being of
the dying and deceased-in the best possible condi-
tion. A dignified disaster.
Alison McChrystal Barnes is a professor of law at
Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
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In Cuba, soon after the renewal of limited U.S.
contacts, groups of visiting American professionals
toured hospitals and nursing homes, asking hard
questions about the ethics of allocating scarce
resources when the patient is old and ill. What
treatments are used for the advanced-dementia
patient with respiratory difficulty? Or for the aged
cancer patient whose system might not well toler-
ate chemotherapy? The questions were virtually
incomprehensible to the attending physicians,
though their education as compared with U.S.
training relies far less on new technology and far
more on comfort care and hope and faith.
Those Cuba-based physicians might ask: Why
treat for so little gain, and so speculatively. The
view they might express is that the society, through
the judgment of the professional, decides when care
that might have therapeutic effect is nevertheless
considered futile because the effect does not war-
rant the investment of professional time and skill,
the allocation of a hospital bed, equipment, and
drugs. This view is common worldwide, in large
part because health care providers are more likely
to be charged with such decision making than are
professionals in the United States, where informed
consent and, increasingly, informed demand for
advertised drugs and hot media-image procedures
shape the landscape of illness and its treatment.
While many would fight for ongoing care, oth-
ers fear it-especially those who are seriously ill in
the technologically wondrous U.S. health care sys-
tem. They may reasonably fear being subject to
tenacious "care pushers," who view the patient's
refusal of recommended treatment, albeit invasive,
exhausting, and limited in effect, as a sign of unrea-
son.
Thus, this is for many a crusade for rights on
two fronts: the right to care on the one hand, and
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the right to die on the other. In adopting health care
policy, society should not consider one without the
other.
The law has developed more in defining choic-
es about dying, as outlined by our excellent
authors, Jaeger and McKhann. In Bouvia v.
Superior Court,' the California court considered
the limits of a competent young woman's right to
refuse nutrition while receiving other care in a hos-
pital at public expense. The court found her choice
to be a legitimate aspect of her autonomy. In In re
Quinlan' and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health,3 the Supreme Court clarified the right of
the incompetent patient to have another refuse
treatment based on the patient's preferences as
expressed when competent. In Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hospital, Inc.,' and its progeny, the
courts have confirmed that artificial nutrition and
hydration are no different in kind from any other
treatment that can be refused on behalf of an
incompetent patient.
Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia
have authorized the use of living wills, which pro-
vide the most authoritative evidence of the patient's
wishes. The remaining three allow the designation
of health care agents to make those decisions.
Thirty-four explicitly permit patients to refuse arti-
ficial nutrition and hydration in their advance
directives.
The focus has moved to the means to die. Few
patients can bear the mayhem of using a gun. If
family members help with the suicide by gun, they
must live with their experience of the loved one's
violent death and the high risk of criminal prosecu-
tion. The preferred means of death is drugs, but
many have found that identifying, collecting, and
utilizing the right amounts of the right drugs is a
risky venture, too. A patient who regularly takes
painkillers builds a tolerance to their potentially
lethal effects. And, the patient's system may no
longer metabolize drugs well enough to create the
desired effect. Some drugs have rarely considered
effects that counteract lethal metabolic action.
Yet, injected drugs generally are harder to
obtain and raise questions about reasons for pre-
scribing and purchasing where assisted suicide is
illegal. In Oregon, the only state that authorizes
prescriptions intended to cause death, lethal injec-
tions are prohibited.
The barriers to causing a quiet death have gen-
erated frightening, heart-wrenching stories of the
bedside watch, when the maximum effects of the
drug begin to pass, the patient still lives, and the
anguished watchers must decide whether to pro-
ceed to cause a death or definitively turn back by
seeking emergency help. The likelihood of this ter-
rible pass has become sufficiently common that a
plastic bag is widely recommended among supplies
for every such watch. In these circumstances, the
plastic bag and the means to secure it over the
patient's head represent a desperate act. Yet worse,
patients, however close to death, may fight the bag,
the plastic on the face, the physical obstruction to
inhaling. The helper asks: Did he or she decide not
to do it?
The market works, and the humor is dark. A
Canadian company has devised a plastic tent for
the upper body that slowly decreases the amount of
available oxygen without collapsing and physically
interfering with inhaling. You can read while you
wait!
Advocates for assisted dying have turned their
hopes to physicians' control over potentially death-
causing drugs. In Oregon, physicians are autho-
rized to write prescriptions at the written request of
a terminal patient to provide drugs that will end
life.7
Yet, the ethical implications and practical
results of such a path should cause everyone to
pause. The physician whose goal has been the life
and best obtainable health of a patient becomes the
source of the lethal means. Further, the medical
curriculum must change to encompass knowledge
to make the physician reliably effective in treat-
ment of the complaint of ongoing life.' Even
research agendas must expand. There are, after all,
no clinical trials on the effectiveness and side effects
of drugs used to cause human death. All assisted
suicide prescriptions are therefore an "off-label"
use of the drug, untested by the means we test other
drugs.
In the courts, the eloquent endorsement of
assisted suicide by the Ninth Circuit en banc in
Compassion in Dying v. Washington' and rulings in
sister circuits were superseded by a unanimous
rejection by the Supreme Court in Vacco v. Quillo
and Washington v. Glucksberg," which distin-
guished between refusing life-prolonging treatment
and choosing assisted death, even for those who are
deemed to be terminally ill.
Who can choose care and who can choose when
to die? Patients who believe that others-from
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other backgrounds or more advantages-are more
likely to be accorded choices in care are likely to
oppose assisted dying. People with disabilities and
their advocates see it as another opportunity to
undervalue their quality of life. Poor members of
minority groups fear that life-sustaining treatment
will be allocated by the same mechanism as most
U.S. health services, according to the ability to
pay.12 The experience of the Dutch, who authorize
assisted death upon repeated requests from the
patient by declining to prosecute participating
physicians, suggests that the slope really is slippery;
incompetent patients have received their doctors'
"help" to die.
Many careful philosophers are divided on the
wisdom of assisted dying." The Catholic Church,
which actively opposed the Oregon initiative, also
speaks with sensitivity and intellectual energy to
the issues of terminal patients, their pain, and their
hopelessness.14
Prospective rules, however, are hard to come by.
Typical of movements on behalf of individual
rights, the momentum comes not from advocates
for the aged but from those dying untimely, of
AIDs or other scourges primarily affecting younger
people." The extension of their vigorous advocacy
model of "independent choice = extreme result" to
the circumstances of many older, chronically dis-
abled and frail might be a very poor fit.'6
A good result of the political movement for
assisted dying is improvement in care of those who
are ill and in pain." Medical societies, however
well-meaning, have been instrumental in impeding
the development of effective treatment because of
the risk of patient impairment and death. The
apparent intransigence of the medical culture in
some states may logically be linked to an American
preoccupation with stoic toughness, fear of liability,
and the dearth of hard medical information about
the appropriate use of barbiturates and other strong
drugs as treatment for pain." Many physicians have
recognized the failure of prevailing care and sought
to improve upon it. Yet, much still needs to be done
in terms of knowledge and practice.
The question of payment for care of terminally
ill patients continues its politically motivated roller-
coaster ride." Generous Medicare hospice benefits
are under investigation for services to patients who
do not qualify for hospice. 20 Facilities seeking
extended benefits for assisted-living and nursing
home patients in some short-term crisis are cur-
tailed from freely invoking hospice care, and letting
the chips fall for the patient who has only two hos-
pice intervals in a lifetime (plus an extension of the
second until death). A consortium of influential
foundations endorses the adoption of a Medicare
billing code for hospital-based palliative care,
expanding the program's focus on acute care and
treatment.
Conclusion
The issues of dying and choice are increasingly
complicated. When? Where? What help? Who
pays? The legal and social model of the good death
is in a period of dynamic evolution. Elder's Advisor
welcomes the thoughtful comments of readers on
the experiences of their clients and their own expe-
riences and approaches to the issues of dying and
choice.
We hope to prepare a reader forum on your
comments. Please send e-mail to elderlaw@
marquette.edu or write to Elder's Advisor, P.O. Box
1881, Milwaukee, WI 53201.
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